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In 2009, health authorities from Taiwan (under the name “Chinese Taipei”)a formally attended the 62nd World Health
Assembly (WHA) of the World Health Organization as observers, marking the country’s participation for the first time
since 1972. The long process of negotiating this breakthrough has been cited as an example of successful global
health diplomacy. This paper analyses this negotiation process, drawing on government documents, formal
representations from both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and key informant interviews. The actors and their motivations,
along with the forums, practices and outcomes of the negotiation process, are detailed. While it is argued that
non-traditional diplomatic action was important in establishing the case for Taiwan’s inclusion at the WHA, traditional
concerns regarding Taiwanese sovereignty and diplomatic representation ultimately played a decisive role. The
persistent influence of these traditional diplomatic questions illustrates the limits of global health diplomacy.
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In 1972 the World Health Assembly (WHA) voted to
formally recognise the People’s Republic of China (PRC),
replacing Taiwan (Republic of China), as the legitimate
representative of China [1]. This resolution, which aligned
WHA membership with the rest of the United Nations
(UN) system, was a by-product of broader shifts in the
structure of East Asian international relations in the early
1970s [2]. Since this shift, there has been domestic and
international disagreement over the terms upon which
Taiwan’s population is represented at the UN, and this has
had a profound effect on participation within technical
agencies such as the World Health Organisation (WHO).
In 1997, the Taiwanese government began to argue, on
humanitarian and scientific grounds, that international
health cooperation should not be subjugated to these
broader political questions. Such arguments became
especially salient as the 2002–2003 SARS (severe acute
respiratory syndrome) outbreak, 2009 influenza pandemic,
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article, unless otherwise stated.emphasized the trans-boundary nature of health risks
in a globalising world.
In 2009, after twelve years of campaigning, a diplomatic
breakthrough was achieved and Taiwan was invited to
participate as an observer in the 62nd WHA as “Chinese
Taipei”. The agreement was widely hailed as a success
for global health diplomacy, with the negotiations said
to mark a new era of closer integration of health and
foreign policy [3]. However, the apparent detente has
since proven short-lived with a resumption of political
disagreement in 2011 over the terms under which
Taiwan could participate.
This paper analyses the process behind Taiwan’s efforts
to gain observer status at the WHA between 2000 and
2011. The research draws on government documents,
formal representations from both sides of the Taiwan
Strait, and key informant interviews in Taiwan. The
actors and their motivations, along with the forums,
practices and outcomes of the negotiation process, are
detailed. While it is argued that global health diplomacy
was important in establishing the case for Taiwan’s inclu-
sion at the WHA, traditional concerns regarding Chinese
and Taiwanese sovereignty and diplomatic representation
ultimately played a decisive role. The persistent influence
of these traditional foreign policy questions illustrate the
limits of global health diplomacy.entral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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The WHA is the plenary decision-making body of the WHO,
the United Nations specialised agency for health, and
the main forum through which member states discuss
and adopt resolutions pertaining to the organisation’s
mandate. Along with member states, other entities can be
granted permission to participate as non-voting observers
at the WHA [4]. There are three formally recognised sub-
types of observer status: (a) non-member states (currently
only the Holy See); (b) representatives of the Palestinian
and Occupied Territories under WHA Resolution 27.37;
and (c) invited observers which participate at the annual
invitation of the Director General (e.g. International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Order
of Malta, Inter-Parliamentary Union) [5,6]. Observer status
has no legal standing under the WHO Constitution.
Taiwanese non-governmental interest in seeking obser-
ver status began in 1972 when medical professionals
and related associations, particularly the Foundation of
Medical Professionals Alliance in Taiwan (FMPAT), be-
came concerned that the country’s exclusion would under-
mine domestic public health. At the diplomatic level, over
the next twenty-five years, participation in WHO was not
pursued as a specific foreign policy priority. Rather, the
efforts of the Taiwanese government focused on regaining
membership in the UN General Assembly as the sole
representative of China [4]. It was not until 1997 that the
Kuomintang (KMT)-led government began to specifically
seek observer status at the WHA. Initial efforts came in
the form of submissions, by WHO member states with
diplomatic relations with Taiwan (such as Paraguay and
Gambia), of a supplementary agenda item calling for the
“Republic of China” to be admitted as an WHA observer.
These proposals were typically rejected by the General
Committee (responsible for finalising the WHA agenda)
on the grounds that WHA Resolution 25.1 had deter-
mined in 1972 that the PRC is the sole representative of
China within WHO (see, for instance, the record of debate
on a proposal by Paraguay to invite “Taiwan” at the 2006
WHA [7]). These determinations implicitly endorsed
the PRC’s “One-China” principle, whereby mainland
China and the island of Taiwan (including other outlying
islands) are considered to be parts of a single state, with
a dispute between the “People’s Republic of China” and
the “Republic of China” over who is the legitimate,
internationally-recognised government of that state.
In 2000 the election of Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP) leader Chen Shui-bian as president led to increased
but ultimately unsuccessful efforts to gain observer status.
It was not until the return to power of the KMT, under
President Ma Ying-jeou, in 2008 that a breakthrough
was achieved alongside improving cross-strait relations.
In January 2009, the WHO Director-General, Margaret
Chan, extended an invitation to the Taiwanese Centrefor Disease Control (CDC) to act as a focal point under
the 2005 revision of the International Health Regulations
(IHR). This new status under the IHR, which is the
WHO’s primary legal instrument for controlling the
international spread of infectious disease, gave Taiwanese
health officials the in principle opportunity to directly
liaise with WHO officials, and attend WHO technical
meetings. Finally, in April 2009, the WHO Secretariat
invited the Taiwanese Department of Health to send a
delegation of officials to attend the 62nd WHA as observers
under the name “Chinese Taipei”. Whilst Taiwan is a mem-
ber of other international trade organizations (including
the organization for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
and the World Trade Organization), the WHO is the
first component of the UN system to grant formal
status to Taiwanese representatives since 1972. Delegates
of “Chinese Taipei”, though not able to vote as full
members of the WHA, have been able to participate in
floor debates, attend WHA side meetings, and formally
lobby full members on issues of concern. This invitation
process has since been repeated every year since 2009 [8].
Global health diplomacy (GHD) concerns “the multi-
level negotiation processes that shape and manage the
global policy environment for health” [9]. GHD has been
described as the terrain where familiar forms of diplomacy
are increasingly applied to health, as a nontraditional
subject of diplomatic negotiations. Alcazar argues that
this development is leading to a “revolution” or “paradigm
shift” in foreign policy that could invert the hitherto low
priority given to health [10].
To what extent can Taiwan’s observer status be hailed
as exemplary of the role of global health diplomacy in
international relations [11]? In particular, to what extent
does this reflect a new development in diplomatic
practice [12]. To better understand the nature of global
health diplomacy, this paper analyses the negotiations
surrounding Taiwan’s observer status in relation to five
key questions:
1. What are the motivations of the parties involved?
2. Who are the actors involved in the process?
3. What forums did negotiations take place in?
4. What were the processes undertaken?, and
5. What were the outcomes of these processes.
By answering each of these research questions, this
paper aims to evaluate the impact of health diplomatic
actors, forums and processes, and thus determine whether
a distinctive form of diplomacy is being practiced. The
extent to which Taiwanese actors deployed a special
form of diplomatic practice, and that this diplomatic
practice mattered to the eventual resolution of the
issue, is one of the central questions which this paper
seeks to answer.
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A narrative and key-informant methodology was developed,
focused on identifying the process, motives and actions of
key Taiwanese actors during the period 2000 – 2008. Initial
investigations and interview foci were developed through a
multidisciplinary literature review of secondary sources,
using a keyword search of PubMed and JSTOR, related
to Taiwan, WHO and international health cooperation
from the health sciences and international relations fields.
Semi-structured interviews with nine key informants were
then used to construct a narrative of the negotiation
process leading up to the 62nd WHA (including the actors,
forums and processes) as well as the stated motivations
of participants. Interviewees were identified with the
assistance of the FMPAT in Taiwan (see Table 1 for
demographics of interviewees), and included former
members of the Taiwanese government under President
Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008), non-governmental groups
(FMPAT) and current Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA)
officials involved in the WHO observer negotiations. The
sensitive nature of the Taiwan – PRC relationship posed a
major challenge to this research project, as did continuing
domestic political disputes between DPP and KMT actors
over the nature of Taiwan’s relationship to the WHO.
Only one official within the then serving Ma administra-
tion of the Kuomintang (KMT) government agreed to be
interviewed. No official (current or former) from the PRC
agreed to be interviewed for this research. To compensate
for their under-representation amongst interviewee’s, we
collected and analysed KMT and PRC official statements,
WHO Summary Records, and media reports (from the
English-language editions of the China Post,Taiwan Times
and the PRC state news agency, Xinhua) to help provide
insight into the process between 2008–2013.
The interviews were analysed to construct a narrative of
negotiations during the study period. Key claims (about
attendance, resolutions etc.) were cross-checked with media
reports/official records where possible. The narrative wasTable 1 Interviewee demographics
Affiliation Approached Interviewed
NGO (Taiwan) 3 1
NGO (PRC) 1 -
Academic (Taiwan) 9 2
Academic (PRC) 2 -
Taiwan DoH (Former) 5 2
Taiwan DoH (Serving) 1 -
Member Of Parliament (Taiwan DPP) 4 1
Member Of Parliament (Taiwan KMT) 2 -
Taiwan MoFA (Former) 4 2
Taiwan MoFA (Serving) 2 1
PRC MoFA (Serving & Former) 1 -doubly verified via official documents, speeches, press
releases and media reports within Taiwan and the
PRC. Additional documents were obtained for WHO
proceedings such as summary records of committee
meetings, minutes of the WHA and Executive Board.
These written sources were used to confirm and further
develop the narrative of the negotiation process uncovered
in the interviews.
Ethics clearance
This research received ethics approval from the London
School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Ethics Committee.
Results
The literature review and interviews were used to
construct a timeline of the key events (Figure 1). Results
are ordered according to the five key research questions.
Motivations
Taiwan’s interest in formal participation in the WHA
was motivated by both public health and foreign policy
goals. As foreign policy, observer status was a potential
means of leveraging participation in other international
organisations and, in time, regaining recognition and
legitimacy as a sovereign state. While this long-term aim
enjoyed cross-party support, there were significant differ-
ences in approach between the KMT and DPP in relation
to the WHA. The KMT, given what it termed “meaningful
participation” and acceptance of the compromise label of
“Chinese Taipei” [13], focused on securing a seat at the
WHA as an end in itself. The DPP, as described by key
informants, saw the achievement of observer status only as
a step towards the longer-term goal of regaining Taiwan’s
international standing [14]. Indeed, observer status was
seen by many DPP interviewees as a regrettable comprom-
ise. In 2007, the DPP-led Taiwanese government submitted
a request for full WHO membership, a significant depart-
ure from the previous goal of observer status [15].
The PRC’s longstanding opposition to Taiwan’s partici-
pation in the WHA stemmed from concerns that observer
status would undermine Beijing’s claim that Taiwan is a
province of the PRC governed by the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP). It was this concern that led to the signing of
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between WHO
and the PRC in 2005 which effectively limited WHO
contact with Taiwanese officials to only those situations
approved by Beijing [16]. The MOU coincided with
negotiations to revise the International Health Regulations
(IHR), concluded in 2005, and was seen as an attempt by
the PRC to head-off any attempts to establish a direct link
between the WHO Secretariat and an IHR national focal
point in Taiwan. Instead of observer status, which Beijing
saw as precedent setting, the PRC offered Taiwanese
Figure 1 Timeline of key events surrounding study period (2000–2011).
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as part of the PRC delegation [17].
Actors and forums
The negotiation process for WHA observer status was
driven (and resisted) by a number of different actors. In
the main, Taiwanese interactions have involved far more
diverse actors than their mainland counterparts who
utilised (and benefited from) their status as the formally
recognised diplomatic representatives of China (including
Taiwan). Internally, the process of seeking observership
was driven by the highest levels of the Taiwanese govern-
ment, and supported by both the foreign policy and health
ministries. Interviewees noted that the formulation of
diplomatic strategy during the DPP period was directed
from the Presidential office. Advice was sought from a
panel of stakeholders within the government, including
the Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC),
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), the Bureau of
International Co-operation (BIC) within the Department
of Health (DoH), and the Taiwanese Centre for Disease
Control (CDC). The WHA issue was also elevated to the
level of the National Security Council (NSC), a body
normally concerned with matters of military defence.
Key policy decisions, such as the 2007 decision to seek
membership, were ultimately made by the President.
These decisions were then promulgated through the
various official and unofficial channels to link with a
process of international lobbying of other governments
and organisations for support.
Importantly, diplomatic actions by senior Taiwanese
representatives remained severely constrained throughout.
The PRC had placed a diplomatic ‘injunction’ against
interactions with Taiwanese officials at the level of
Vice-Minister or above [18]. Under Article 7 of the 2005
Memorandum of Understanding between the WHO
Secretariat and China, for example, WHO agreed not to
invite to the WHA or other meetings Taiwanese partici-
pants at the level of Director-General or above [15]. Muchof Taiwan’s diplomacy at higher levels is thus conducted
informally by proxies of the government. One interviewee,
not formally engaged by the Taiwanese government, was
specifically tasked with meeting a number of European
ministers of health and foreign affairs to lobby for WHA
participation. Others were involved in extensive lobbying
of US congress members, resulting in the passing of the
Taiwan Participation Bill and the formation of a vocal
congressional caucus [19]. These informal avenues were
seen as a viable way of circumventing PRC restrictions,
and thus reassuring friendly governments, while still
directly lobbying decision-makers.
Importantly, the strictures placed on Taiwanese diplo-
matic officials were less evident for health officials. Officials
from the DoH and the CDC were able to interact relatively
freely with their overseas counterparts, including the US
Centers for Disease Control. Indeed, the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Health Taskforce (now
the Health Working Group), where both Taiwan and
the PRC are members, was initiated in part at the urging of
Taiwanese health actors. Taiwanese interviewees familiar
with the DoH recalled that this was one of the main
conduits for information exchange between the Taiwanese
authorities and their Beijing counterparts. Interactions with
the WHO bureaucracy were, however, severely restricted.
DoH and CDC officials with international expertise in
specific public health issue areas had, up to 2005, been able
to interact on a piecemeal basis as advisors to WHO,
attending various technical meetings. In 2005, this arrange-
ment was altered, under the conditions of the MOU, to a
system where Taiwanese officials could only participate in a
personal capacity after approval from Beijing’s MoH [15].
Given the above restrictions, one further set of actors
in the WHA process was Taiwanese public health and
medical professionals. Of particular importance, acknowl-
edged by many interviewees, was the FMPAT which acts
as an umbrella organisation for physicians and public
health professionals in Taiwan. FMPAT actively and
persistently lobbied international medical bodies, such
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Federation of Public Health Associations, to support
Taiwan’s interaction with the WHO [20]. Interviewees
claimed that the informal lobbying of health bureaucrats,
scientific experts and health NGOs by Taiwanese health
professionals kept the question of Taiwan’s status on the
policy agenda. These informal civil-society interactions
appear to have influenced other non-governmental actors,
coinciding with an increasing focus on global health due
to the 2003 SARS outbreaks and the 2008 change in
government.
In the PRC, the Taiwan observer issue was predomin-
antly dealt with by traditional diplomatic actors. Policy
towards Taiwan is directed at the highest levels by the
State Council which, in turn, is operationalised by a
ministerial-level organisation, the Taiwan Affairs Office
(TAO), and a ‘social organisation’, the Association for
Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) officials led opposition to
Taiwanese participation in the WHA, making formal
representations to embassies in Geneva, the WHO Secre-
tariat and on the floor of the WHA. The PRC was not,
however, unaware of the proxy diplomatic influence
wielded by Taiwanese NGOs and health professionals.
Indeed, the PRC was concerned to limit their influence
by seeking to “approve” the participation of Taiwanese
nationals in NGO delegations. Some interviewees, with
a public health background, noted that their participation
at WHO meetings and at the WHA, as expert advisors or
NGO delegates, was sometimes blocked, potentially at the
behest of the PRC.
Bilateral interactions between the Chinese mainland
and Taiwan, when they did occur, were mainly conducted
between non-governmental and quasi-government organi-
sations, as well as government officials in non-government
capacities. Officially, Beijing recognises Taiwan as a prov-
ince of China, meaning that official governmental interac-
tions could occur between Mainland provincial officials
(such as those from Fujian province) and Taiwan [21].
Cross-strait dialogue, mainly on economic and cultural
issues, has traditionally taken place between ARATS and its
Taiwanese counterpart, the Straits Exchange Foundation
(SEF). Such contact between the PRC and Taiwan during
the DPP period (2000–2008), however, became virtually
non-existent owing to the mainland view that President
Chen was a “stubborn Taiwan independence advocate”
[22]. Relations with the KMT were more positive albeit
controlled within certain parameters. Initiated by the 2005
meeting between Hu Jintao (General Secretary of the CCP)
and Lien Chan (Party Chairman of the KMT) in 2005, con-
tact between CCP and KMT officials occurred at the party
level, although never in their capacity as formal state repre-
sentatives. Further meetings since 2008 have seemingly
solidified the relationship between the two parties [23].The process of global health diplomacy
The process of garnering support for Taiwan’s attendance
at the WHA as an observer was complex. Several axes of
negotiations were focused on the global health issues
which Taiwan’s exclusion from the WHA exacerbated,
while other arguments focused on traditional diplomatic
concerns regarding sovereignty and the political relation-
ship between Taipei and Beijing.
The decision to shift from WHO membership to WHA
observer status, was viewed by many interviewees as a
regrettable, but necessary, compromise. In contrast to the
annual applications for UN membership, which were
viewed as political symbolism, there was an added sense
that WHA participation was both practically important
and feasible. To this end, Taiwanese government officials,
even those within the pro-independence DPP government,
considered the pursuit of observer status (which does not
imply statehood or sovereign legal status) a compromise
position which the PRC could accept. Changes in the
choice of moniker for the application process track the
degree to which the traditional issue of sovereignty was
entangled in the WHA process. Between 1997 and 2006,
allied governments (normally Paraguay) introduced an
agenda item inviting Taiwan to participate as an observer
and initiating formal WHA discussion on Taiwan’s
exclusion [14]. Taiwan initially sought invitation to the
WHA under the name “Republic of China (Taiwan)”
[24]. Increasingly less controversial names were used in
applications between 2002 and 2006, including, ‘Health
Authorities of Taiwan’ and ‘Taiwan, health entity’ [25].
Then, in the 2007 membership application, the deliberately
provocative name of “Taiwan” was used. Some traditional
allies who had previously supported observer status refused
to support the 2007 bid, although a heated debate at
the WHA was prompted when the agenda item was
introduced by Taiwan’s diplomatic allies [14]. According
to interviewees involved in the 2007 application, patience
had worn thin. Although the repeatedly failed member-
ship efforts were seen by some as a “fiasco”, after more
than ten years of applying, there was a general sense of
frustration with the continued refusal to grant WHA
observer status. By 2007, the traditional issue of sovereign
status and the WHA were once again conflated, with the
WHA used as a forum for highlighting the ‘injustice’ of
Taiwan’s exclusion from the international community.
Taiwan’s lack of formal recognition led to the use of two
distinct diplomatic strategies. First, bilateral and informal
lobbying of ‘friendly governments’, a long-established
method of Taiwanese diplomacy, was once again deployed
in the service of the WHA process. Interviewees, for
instance, were involved in the lobbying of EU and US
ministers and legislators see also [4]. The second strategy
was use of the small cadre of countries who have
diplomatic relations with Taiwan to push its case within
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two strategies relied on different actors and forums
(one informal, one formal), they worked towards the same
end: establishing the humanitarian and health case for
Taiwan’s inclusion in the WHA. Interviewees noted that
officials of friendly governments fully accepted the health
case for Taiwan’s inclusion. Few governments, however,
were willing to extend the argument within formal forums
for Taiwan’s international recognition.
The cross-straits environment during the process of seek-
ing WHA observership shifted multiple times. In broad
terms, relations were closer from 2008 onwards than
during 1997–2008. After eight years of pro-independence
government, and increased cross-strait tensions, the return
to power of the KMT in 2008 was accompanied by a milder
diplomatic climate: what incoming President Ma Ying-jeou
described as a “diplomatic truce” [27]. Two key points
emerge. The first is that, for some time, the PRC’s position
has been that dialogue was only possible with a Taiwanese
government which accepted the 1992 consensus of a
“One China, broadly interpreted” compromise. Under
this consensus, both parties would agree on the ‘One
China’ doctrine, but interpret differently who the rightful
government of China is. The DPP, committed to full
Taiwanese independence, has never supported the agree-
ment [28]. The KMT has endorsed the 1992 consensus
and, in its discussions with the CCP, reaffirmed this
understanding as the basis of cross-strait co-operation
[29]. Many interviewees with political ties to the DPP
considered acceptance of the 1992 consensus by the
KMT as a “major concession” to the PRC which damaged
Taiwan’s status as an international entity [23].
What outcomes were achieved by global health diplomacy?
On 28 April 2009 the Taiwanese DoH received a fax
from the WHO Secretariat inviting “the Department of
Health, Chinese Taipei” to send a delegation to the 62nd
WHA held the following month [30]. The letter, addressed
to the Minister of Health Yeh Ching-chuan, ended 38 years
of exclusion from the WHA. The Minister, Deputy
Minister and senior health officials attended the WHA
in 2009 and 2010 as observers under the name “Chinese
Taipei” [31]. While lauded as a diplomatic breakthrough,
in reflecting on the role of global health diplomacy, it is
important to take account of a series of outcomes along
the way. Moreover, the political arrangement eventually
reached has proven to be more complex than first
appeared.
The first outcome was the repeated failure to be invited
as an observer to the WHA. Numerous procedural
motions to place the issue of Taiwanese participation
on the WHA agenda by its allies, notably Paraguay or
Gambia, were regularly defeated [25]. The application
for WHO membership in 2007 was also defeated. Thesecond outcome was the 2005 Memorandum of Under-
standing between the WHO Secretariat and the PRC.
The actual text of the MOU has not been publicly
released, but an implementation document is available
[15]. The memorandum significantly curtailed contact
between the WHO Secretariat and Taiwanese authorities.
As a result, Taiwanese representatives were able to attend
only 21 of one thousand or so WHO technical meetings
between 2005 and 2008 [32]. This practice reportedly
continued in 2011 when Taiwan applied to take part in
21 WHO working panels and technical activities, of
which eight were approved, nine were rejected and four
received no response [33].
Third, the inclusion of a “universal application” clause
in the revised IHR (2005), after lobbying by Taiwan and
its allies, drew stark attention to Taiwan’s predicament. The
inclusion of the clause allowed Taiwan and other “uncov-
ered regions” to claim that they should be allowed to report
and receive information through the IHR.
The final outcome was the eventual invitation to the
WHA in 2009 and 2010. Although gaining observer status
was greeted with equanimity by both the DPP and KMT,
the terms by which Taiwan attended the WHA remain in
dispute. According to the KMT, Taiwan participated in the
two WHAs with almost the same rights and privileges as
a full member state, serving as a model for participation in
other intergovernmental bodies [34]. By DPP accounts,
the terms of attendance reduced Taiwan to the same
status as an international NGO [35]. The extent to
which an annual invitation, granted yearly by the WHO
Director-General, will continue in the future remains
unclear. In 2011 and again in 2012, WHO informed the
Taiwanese delegation that its named title would change,
from “Chinese Taipei” to “Taiwan, province of China”. The
decision led to immediate protest by Taiwan, as well as
concern by the US Department of State at what seemed a
unilateral decision by the WHO Secretariat [36].
Discussion
The sensitivity of the PRC-Taiwan relationship resulted
in KMT and PRC participants being under-represented
amongst the key informants. We have attempted to con-
trol for potential data biases by interrogating the official
statements of these under-represented parties, but it
must be acknowledged that this limits, in particular, the
scope of our insights into the motivations of these actors
and the processes they undertook post 2008. Nonetheless,
the sensitivity of both PRC and Taiwanese actors to the
WHA issue should not merely be seen as a source of data
bias, but also as an indicator of the continuing centrality
of traditional political concerns. It is precisely the reticence
of these actors to discuss the WHA process which suggests
limits to the practice of “global health diplomacy” as a space
where humanitarian concerns for health cooperation
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This is further reinforced by the swift change in the PRC’s
attitude towards Taiwan’s WHA status, following the
re-ascension of the KMT to power in 2008. It is reasonable
to infer that the KMT’s long-standing commitment to the
“One-China” policy, in contrast to the DPP’s professed
desire for independence, were key in allaying PRC fears that
WHA observer status would precipitate further formal
diplomatic recognition elsewhere within the UN system.
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to conclude that
health concerns have no special status, and that attention
to them rests solely upon traditional diplomatic processes,
actors and forums. To begin with, it appears that health
concerns have a special motivating force. It was the
WHO’s plenary body alone which was targeted by both
DPP and KMT governments for greater engagement
whereby many UN bodies would have served the purpose
of increasing diplomatic recognition. Two factors appear
to explain the special status of health issues on Taiwan’s
foreign policy agenda. First, the occurrence of two major
public health events during this period intensified domes-
tic political pressure to seek greater access to global health
infrastructure. The first – an outbreak of hand, foot and
mouth enterovirus (HFMD) in 1998 – affected a large
number of schoolchildren and caused 78 deaths in Taiwan
[37]. At the time, Taiwan was without a dedicated domes-
tic disease outbreak investigation agency, and public
health authorities also found themselves unable to access
WHO assistance directly [38]. The outbreak led to the
establishment of the CDC in Taiwan in 1999, and to
increased public debate about the need for participation
in WHO. The second event, the 2003 SARS outbreak,
resulted in 680 cases and 81 deaths in Taiwan [39]. Once
again, when cases were first identified in April 2003,
the Taiwanese government attempted to notify WHO
directly through official channels. However, without formal
relations, official WHO notifications were delayed and
direct technical assistance was even blocked [40]. While
the outbreaks generated considerable public concern
around Taiwan’s exclusion from the international health
community, and intensified political pressure to resolve the
diplomatic roadblocks, neither led to a change in the polit-
ical impasse. Interviewees noted that, despite its institu-
tional isolation, Taiwan dealt with the two events relatively
well. Access to WHO’s technical expertise, although useful,
was not considered essential by health officials.
Second, the international discourse around global
health gave other member states and WHO itself, along
with other global health institutions, a clear rationale for
facilitating Taiwan’s participation. By 2009, the SARS out-
break was superceded by fears of an influenza pandemic,
not only of the H1N1 virus that actually emerged, but the
highly pathogenic H5N1 virus. Given Asia’s geographic
proclivity to new outbreaks, the continued exclusion of alarge population (23 million) from WHO activities was
widely seen as problematic, especially amid the increasing
transboundary mobility of health determinants and out-
comes [32]. In short, global public health goals during this
period may have intensified pressure on governments on
both sides of the Taiwan Strait to reach agreement.
Third, it seems clear that novel diplomatic processes
were critical to the positive case for Taiwan’s inclusion at
the WHA, even as the presence of traditional sovereignty
concerns continued to prevent resolution. Taiwan’s use of
strategies characteristic of global health diplomacy – in-
cluding bilateral lobbying of health officials, and the use of
NGOs such as FMPAT and the WMA – were generally
acknowledged by interviewees as crucial to keeping the
issue at the forefront of WHA politics leading up to obser-
ver status. Although these strategies sometimes relied on
traditional foreign policy actors and forums, they worked
towards the same end - establishing the humanitarian and
health case for Taiwan’s inclusion in the WHA. Without
Taiwan’s status remaining a prominent fixture of official
and unofficial WHA debates, it is unclear that the even-
tual détente in cross-strait relations would have yielded a
change in WHA status.
Finally, whilst international and domestic pressure
generated by Taiwan’s campaigning for observer status
was influential, it seems clear that perennial concerns over
the status of cross-Strait relations stymied progress. Both
political parties in Taiwan acknowledge the importance of
the 2008 detente but disagree over the extent to which it
was the primary factor. The KMT government denied that
the 2009 invitation was “approved” by China, although it
is recognised that the invitation would not have been
possible without improved relations between the CCP and
the KMT [41]. Beijing, after eight years of dealing with a
pro-independence DPP-led government in Taiwan, may
have perceived the new KMT government as a more con-
ducive partner for economic integration and a bulwark
against Taiwanese nationalism [42]. Broader foreign policy
concerns, namely an apparent desire to allay US govern-
ment concerns about the tensions between the PRC and
Taiwan, also gave the WHA negotiation process added
impetus as a way of demonstrating improved relations
[43]. Thus, there remains disagreement about the extent
to which observer status was ‘bought’ with political con-
cessions or whether it merely represented the fruits of a
more cooperative cross-strait relationship.
Conclusion
This paper has described Taiwan’s road to WHA observer
status as a complex milieu of motivations, actors and
forums. As well as helping to understand the potentially
distinct features of global health diplomacy, this analysis
illustrates its limits. First, the WHA process shows the
increasing relevance of both state and non-state actors in
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the WHA were open only to the PRC and, whilst some
governments which recognise Taiwan could act as proxies
for its interests, most diplomatic channels remained
closed to Taiwan. Both the 2000–2008 WHA campaigns,
and the 2009 cross-strait détente, were conducted
using a complex web of non-governmental and quasi-
governmental entities – from both traditional political
entities (e.g. KMT) and those focused on public health
goals (e.g. FMPAT). While this suggests “new diplomacy”,
at times these proxy actors were largely confined to inter-
action with their counterparts in health-specific forums or
lobbying state representatives, rather than formal diplo-
matic engagement. Moreover, perhaps in recognition of
their potential influence, the PRC then used its traditional
diplomatic advantage to push for their exclusion from
many WHO technical meetings. Thus, in contrast to the
characterisation of new diplomacy as a process where
bureaucrats form quasi-official networks to solve global
governance problems [44], Taiwanese officials were only
able to create a limited set of bilateral relationships and
still sat outside some of the most important technical
networks.
Second, the case seems to illustrate the continuing
dominance of traditional foreign policy concerns, such
as state sovereignty, over the priorities of global public
health actors. The PRC’s overriding concern was to retain
its longstanding foreign policy goal of ensuring that it
is the sole recognised government of China (both the
mainland and Taiwan). Once Taiwanese participation
could be achieved on grounds that did not contradict,
and perhaps even furthered this goal, Beijing relented.
Nor were the motives of Taipei purely on health grounds.
Although disease outbreaks generated domestic and inter-
national political pressure, the goal of accessing greater
global health cooperation remained infused with foreign
policy considerations. In particular, it is clear that partici-
pating as part of the Chinese delegation was politically
unacceptable and there was thus a concomitant desire,
particularly on the part of the DPP, to link observer status
with full membership in WHO and ultimately the inter-
national community as a whole. In other words, foreign
policy and health goals are potentially in competition with
one another, and it is only when the latter does not create
tension in the former that progress can be made.
Third, a sharp delineation between traditional and “new”
diplomacy is difficult. Barred from formal diplomatic chan-
nels, the processes used by Taiwan to advance its cause
demonstrated a canny understanding of these processes.
The annual application by Taiwan’s allies to the WHA for
observer status, for example, was critical to keeping the
issue alive. Lobbying of governmental and nongovernmen-
tal counterparts worldwide by health professionals, officials
and ministers was also continuous and well-organised. Thisdiplomatic ‘guerrilla campaign’ contrasted with the formal
diplomatic practice maintained by the PRC which focused
on denying the separateness of Taiwan, and the reaffirm-
ation of core UN principles of sovereignty and deference to
the internal affairs of states. While complex and somewhat
messy, traditional and new diplomacy came together to
eventually produce agreement.
Finally, to what extent did global health diplomacy
impact on the ultimate progression of events? Was the
eventual breakthrough the result of the special contribution
of global health diplomacy, or was it simply traditional
diplomacy in action? Initially, it may be easy to discount
much of the process of seeking observer status as mean-
ingless. Without the change in Taiwan’s government in
2008, it is unlikely that cross-strait relations would have
improved to the extent that the PRC felt willing to agree
to Taiwan’s participation. Such a reductionist account,
however, does not fully explain the fact that the WHA
remains the only UN-affiliated organisation where Taiwan
has an official presence. Other forums, such as the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), re-
main closed, suggesting that global health issues have a
special status. Nor does the change in cross-strait relations
explain why agreement was not reached in the 1990s,
when relations were relatively good, following the agree-
ment of the 1992 consensus, suggesting that the period
of intensive global health diplomacy prior to 2008 was
important in motivating moves towards Taiwan’s observer
status at the WHA.
From the above analysis, we may conclude that, whilst
global health diplomacy may have been important in
making the positive case for Taiwan’s observer status, it was
not sufficient alone to overcome longstanding foreign
policy tensions. The question of Taiwan’s sovereignty,
and the fluctuating temperature of cross-strait relations,
needed to be addressed before health concerns could come
to the fore. At the same time, global health diplomacy suc-
ceeded where other efforts to gain Taiwanese participation
in the UN have failed. This suggests that health, as part of
both old and new diplomacy, might occupy a potentially
influential place in future global politics.Endnotes
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